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Abstract - This paper proposes a novel framework for analysing and synthesising engineering system risks 
on the basis of a generic Fuzzy Evidential Reasoning (FER) approach. The approach is developed to simplify 
the inference process and overcome the problems of traditional fuzzy rule based methods in risk analysis and 
decision making. The framework, together with the FER approach has been applied to model the safety of an 
offshore engineering system. The benchmarking between the new model and a well-established Rule based 
Inference Methodology using the Evidential Reasoning (RIMER) is conducted to demonstrate its reliability 
and unique characteristics. It will facilitate subjective risk assessment in different engineering systems where 
historical failure data is not available in their safety practice. 
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Acronym
2
  
AHP Analytic hierarchy process 
ALARP As low as reasonably practical 
CPP Controllable pitch propeller 
DP Dynamic positioning  
D-S Dempster-Shafer 
ER Evidential reasoning 
FPSO  Floating, production, storage and offloading  
FRBER  Fuzzy rule based evidential reasoning  
FST  Fuzzy set theory  
IDS Intelligent decision system via evidential reasoning 
MADM Multiple attribute decision making 
PRS Position reference system 
RCO Risk control option 
RIMER Rule based inference methodology using the evidential reasoning 
TOPSIS Technique for order preference by similarity to an ideal solution 
 
Notation 
 
Ai
k
 The linguistic variables used to describe Xk (iM; kL). 
Xk The k
th
 child attribute in a parent-child link. 
Dj The linguistic variables used to describe Y (jN). 
Y The parent attribute in a parent-child link. 
                                                 
2
 The singular and plural of an acronym are always spelled the same. 
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L The total number of the child attributes. 
M The total number of linguistic variables used to describe the Xk child attribute. 
N The total number of linguistic variables used to describe the parent attribute. 
F A logical function representing the relationship between Ai
k
 and Dj. 
i,j
k
 The belief degree to which Dj is believed to be the parent attribute if the k
th
 child attribute is 
only described by the i
th
 linguistic variable. 
wk The weight of the k
th
 child attribute in the X-Y link. 
pi
k
 The subjective probability of the input information from real observations belonging to Ai
k
. 
j
k
 The belief degree to which Dj is believed to be the parent attribute if the input satisfies the k
th
 
child attribute linguistic vector Ai
k
 (iM). 
k
Dm  The probability mass unassigned to any individual output variables Dj, when synthesising j
k
 
(kL). 
HS
u  The utility values of SH. 
RI Failure ranking index. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The growing technical complexity of large engineering systems, together with the intense public concern 
over their safety has stimulated the research and development of novel risk analysis and safety assessment 
procedures. However, the process of developing cost-effective, timely and flexible risk assessment methods 
for complex and large engineering systems has been the subject of considerable debate in recent years. It is 
mainly due to the fact that modelling and analysing complex risk scenarios increasingly needs to acquire the 
historical failure data/information as sufficient and precise as possible and to treat relevant uncertainties as 
flexible and comprehensive as possible.  
 
It may be difficult to use  typical safety assessment approaches such as a probabilistic risk assessment 
approach in situations where there is a lack of information and past experience, or in ill-defined situations in 
risk analysis [26]. Under prevailing circumstances, little numerical data of any statistical significance may be 
available to sufficiently support traditional “objective” risk analysis in complex engineering systems. For 
example, to analyse system safety in the design and operation of large offshore installations with a high level 
of innovation, it is highly possible that there is a lack of historical failure data. The uncertainty encountered 
in such engineering system safety analysis does not fit the axiomatic basis of probability theory. It is usually 
caused by not only randomness but also the inherent fuzziness of parameters and the incompleteness of input. 
In engineering safety analysis, fuzziness exists due to ill-defined concepts in observation, or the inaccuracy 
and poor reliability of instruments used to make observations [14]. Incompleteness may be caused due to weak 
implication which occurs when an expert is unable to establish a strong correlation between premise and 
conclusion [14]. This means that intrinsically vague information may coexist with conditions of “lack of 
specificity” originating from evidence not strong enough to completely support a hypothesis but only with 
degrees of belief or credibility [3], [37].  
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One realistic way to express fuzziness is to employ subjective/linguistic assessment based on fuzzy set theory 
(FST) [5]. One of the most popular fuzzy logic approaches is developed based on the fuzzy IF-THEN rules, 
where conditional parts and/or conclusions contain linguistic variables [41]. It can model the qualitative 
aspects of human knowledge and thus does not require an expert to provide a precise point at which a risk 
factor exists. This actually provides a tool for working directly with the linguistic information, which is 
commonly used in representing risk factors and carrying out safety assessment [1], [2], [9], [13], [18], [21], 
[25], [28], [29], [33]. The Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory of evidence [8], [20] based on the concept of belief 
function is well suited to modelling subjective credibility induced by partial evidence [23]. Based on the D-S 
theory, an Evidential Reasoning (ER) approach [32], [35] has been developed to describe and handle 
uncertainties using the concept of the degrees of belief, which can model incompleteness and ignorance 
explicitly. The kernel of this approach is an ER algorithm, which requires modelling the narrowing of the 
hypothesis set with the accumulation of evidence [35]. The approach shows great potential in multiple 
attribute decision making (MADM) under uncertainty and its wide applications have been documented in the 
literature [15], [21], [24], [29], [34], [35]. 
 
In recognition of the need to handle the hybrid of both fuzziness and incompleteness in complex engineering 
system safety, it may be desirable and beneficial to extend the fuzzy logic framework to cover credibility 
uncertainty based on FST and ER. The benefit of combining fuzzy logic and belief models may become 
substantial when a lack of specificity in data is prevalent [13]. Several studies have been conducted to 
investigate the relationship between fuzzy sets and D-S theory and suggest different ways of integrating them 
[7], [10], [17], [30], [31], [33]. Based on fuzzy logic and ER, a generic Rule based Inference Methodology 
using the Evidential Reasoning (RIMER) has been proposed [33] and applied to engineering system safety 
analysis [13], [14]. The model is designed on the basis of a fuzzy rule base with a belief structure. Such a rule 
base can function on the solutions of the non-linear causal relationships as well as incompleteness and 
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vagueness associated with risk parameters/decision attributes. It can be presented as a belief rule expression 
matrix, which forms a basis in the inference mechanism of RIMER and provides a framework for 
representing expert knowledge in a compact format [33]. The feature of the rule base (the difference from the 
original IF-THEN rule bases) lies in the fact that the rules include various belief degrees distributed into the 
multiple linguistic variables of the conclusion attribute. The main advantage of using belief degrees is to 
capture uncertainty and non-linear casual relationships in safety assessment. However, such a merit could 
also lead to some debates. The corresponding complex uncertainty inference may be not friendly enough to 
mathematically unsophisticated users. A Fuzzy Rule-based Bayesian Reasoning (RuRBaR) approach was 
developed to simplify the uncertainty inference of belief rule bases [37]. However, this approach, like RIMER, 
still needs to construct and establish the complex rule bases, which may be error-prone. There is a high 
possibility to assign incompatible belief degrees in a fuzzy rule base when a large scale scheme with 
hundreds of rules is defined entirely subjectively. “Incompatible” means contradictory belief degree 
distributions in two/more relevant rules, in which one rule which should have a better risk evaluation has 
actually been assigned belief degrees presenting a worse safety level. For example, in the safety rule base 
developed by Liu et al. [13], [14], Rule 85 and Rule 86 with their IF parts as the sets of {“reasonable low” 
failure occurrence likelihood (L), “moderate” failure consequence severity (C), “highly unlikely” failure 
consequence probability (P)} and {“reasonable low” L, “moderate” C, “unlikely” P} have been assigned 
their THEN parts as the sets of  {(0.5, “good”), (0.5, “average”), (0, “fair”), (0, “poor”)} and {(0.6, “good”), 
(0.4, “average”), (0, “fair”), (0, “poor”)}. Furthermore, when new attributes are identified in the IF parts, it 
may be difficult to update the original rule base and to produce the output without the reestablishment of the 
whole fuzzy rule base systems.  
 
This paper proposes a novel Fuzzy Evidential Reasoning (FER) approach, being capable of eliminating the 
“incompatible” belief degree distributions in traditional fuzzy IF-THEN rule based risk assessment methods 
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while making subjective risk assessment more rational and visible. The new method is generated by 
extending the RIMER approach on the basis of the combination of several different theories and techniques, 
such as the FST [40], an AHP technique [19] and the ER approach [36], etc. It shares the same philosophy 
with the divorce approach in Bayesian networks [11], showing its superiority in modelling incompleteness of 
subjective judgement and accommodating additional attributes compared to the RIMER. The main feature of 
the new method is first to analyse the conditional belief degree distributions of the parent (conclusion) 
attributes given the individual child (antecedent) attributes in a fuzzy hierarchical link, then use all 
conditional belief degree distributions as an effective link to transfer input (based on child attributes) to 
output (based on a common parent attribute) and finally synthesise all output together using the ER approach. 
By doing so, the complex work of constructing fuzzy rule bases can be replaced through establishing 
relatively straightforward fuzzy link diagrams. Contributions drawn from such a generic method are 
examined by a case study of collision risk between a floating, production, storage and offloading (FPSO) unit 
and a shuttle tanker due to technical failure during a tandem offloading operation. It can be applied to 
facilitate subjective risk assessment in different sectors when subjective data collection is needed for risk 
prioritisation of the identified hazards in engineering systems. 
 
2. EXPERT SYSTEM STRUCTURE BASED ON THE NEW FUZZY EVIDENTIAL 
REASONING  
The generic structure of fuzzy link based expert systems is described in this section. Being the extension of 
fuzzy rule based systems, fuzzy link based expert systems can be generally considered as a multiple attribute 
decision making tool. The starting point for investigating a fuzzy link based system is to construct a 
hierarchy of representing the relationship among all decision attributes from the lowest level to the top one. 
A knowledge base and an inference engine are then designed to infer useful conclusions from observable 
facts. Unlike rule based systems, the knowledge base is presented by belief links between a single pair of 
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parent-child attributes in two neighbouring levels instead of IF-THEN rules (between multiple antecedent-
conclusion attributes). This section mainly concentrates on the development of belief links and the generation 
of the knowledge base, in part because they are the relatively novel and unsatisfactorily developed in the 
literature. The inference engine based on an ER approach for capturing the non-linear relationship between 
attributes is briefly illustrated. 
 
A fuzzy link base model can be established to deal with imprecision using linguistic assessments with belief 
degrees. The model employing fuzzy belief links where the parent-child attributes contain linguistic variables, 
can model the qualitative aspects of human knowledge and the reasoning process. It can be represented as 
follows. 
R= <X, A, Y, D, F, , w>                                      (1) 
In the above, X={Xk, k=1, …, L} is the set of child attributes, with each of them taking values from an array 
of fuzzy sets A={Ai
k, i=1, …, M}. Ai
k
 represents a set of fuzzy values (linguistic variables) used to describe 
the attribute Xk (k=1, …, L). The array {X1, …, XL} defines a list of finite conditions, representing the 
elementary states of a decision problem domain. D={Dj, j=1, …, N} is the set of linguistic variables used to 
describe the parent attribute Y in a parent-child link, representing a utility decision space. F is a logical 
function, representing the relationship between Ai
k
 and Dj using belief links j
k
 ( 1
1
, 

M
i
k
ji ). w={wk, k=1, …, 
L} is the set of child attribute weights. The combination of all such parameters constitutes one basic element 
of a multiple level hierarchical belief link based model R, given YX’ (the set of child attributes of the next 
higher level analysis). Consequently, all the j
k
 at different levels can be analysed and connected/multiplied 
to represent the relationship between the bottom level attributes and the top level one. 
 
Suppose input information associated with each Xk can be obtained and represented by Ai
k
 with appropriate 
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subjective probabilities pi
k
. A fuzzy link based model given by Eq. (1) can then be extended to emphasise the 
relationship between the bottom level Ai and top level Dj and transform the input associated with Xk (k = 
1, …, L) (observation facts) into the output based on a utility decision making space Dj (j = 1, …, N) as 
follows. 


M
i
k
ji
k
i
k
j p
1
,                                                        (2) 
To capture the non-linear relationship between decision attributes Xk (k = 1, …, L), the ER approach [32], [36] 
is used to combine all output j
k
 (j = 1, …, N; k = 1, …, L) associated with Xk and generate final conclusions. 
The window-based and graphically designed intelligent decision system (IDS) has been developed based on 
the ER approach [35], which facilitates the combination [14]. Having represented belief degrees j
k
 
transformed from input for each decision attribute Xk, the ER approach can be directly implemented as 
follows. First, transform the degrees of belief j
k
 for all j = 1, …, N, k = 1, …, L into basic probability masses 
using the following equations [14], [32], [36]. 
k
jk
k
j wm  , 

N
j
k
jk
N
j
k
j
k
D wmm
11
11  , 
,1 k
k
D wm  and 







N
j
k
jk
k
D wm
1
1~  , for all j = 1, …, N and k = 1, …, L.                               (3)                        
where kD
k
D
k
D mmm
~  for all k = 1, …, L and 1
1


L
k
kw . The probability mass assigned to the top level 
attribute D, which is unassigned to any individual output variables Dj, is split into two parts, one caused by 
the relative importance of the k
th
 attribute (or kDm ), and the other due to the incompleteness of the subjective 
probabilities/ transformed belief degrees associated with Ai
k
 (or kDm
~ ). 
 
Next, aggregate all the output from Xk (k = 1, …, L) to generate the combined degree of belief in each 
possible top level linguistic variable Dj of D. Suppose mj
I(k)
 is the combined belief degree in Dj by 
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aggregating all the output from the k child attributes and mD
I(k)
 is the remaining belief degree unassigned to 
any top level output variable. Let mj
I(1)
 = mj
1
 and mD
I(1)
 = mD
1
. Then the overall combined belief degree in Dj 
is generated as follows [14]. 
{Dj}: ][
1)(1)(1)(
)1(
)1( 

  kj
kI
D
k
D
kI
j
k
j
kI
jkI
kI
j mmmmmmKm  
)()()( ~ kI
D
kI
D
kI
D mmm   k = 1, …, L – 1; 
{D}: ]~~~~[~ 1)(1)(1)()1(
)1( 

  kD
kI
D
k
D
kI
D
k
D
kI
DkI
kI
D mmmmmmKm  
][ 1
)(
)1(
)1( 

  kD
kI
DkI
kI
D mmKm  
,1
1
1 1
1)(
)1(
















 
N
j
N
jt
t
k
t
kI
jkI mmK  k = 1, …, L – 1; 
{Dj}: )(
)(
1
LI
D
LI
j
j
m
m

 (j = 1, …, N), and {Dj}: )(
)(
1
~
LI
D
LI
D
D
m
m

                                               (4) 
where D  represents the remaining belief degrees unassigned to any Dj. 
 
3. USE OF THE NEW FER TO SUBJECTIVE RISK ASSESSMENT 
The proposed framework for modelling system safety consists of eight major steps required for subjective 
risk analysis using the FER approach. 
1. Identify the attributes of risk analysis (associated with X and Y). 
2. Establish a hierarchy to represent the relationship between the attributes (related to w). 
3. Define the linguistic variables used to describe the attributes (associated with A and D). 
4. Construct a fuzzy link base with belief structures (associated with F and ). 
5. Input transformation (associated with p) 
6. Reasoning mechanism based on an ER algorithm. 
7. Risk ranking 
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8. Validation using benchmarking. 
Each step of the framework is described in detail in the following sections.  
 
Step 1: Having stated the framework above, the first step to develop a general risk analysis model is to 
identify appropriate risk attributes. After the study of traditional quantitative risk methods like failure modes, 
and effects (FMEA) analysis, it can be seen that there are three basic attributes - failure likelihood (L), 
consequence severity (C) and failure consequence probability (P) (i.e. the probability that possible 
consequences happen, given the occurrence of the failure), which are used in assessing the safety (S) 
associated with each failure mode of a component and in determining safety level of a whole system [13], 
[14] , [29].  
 
Step 2: As a result, a hierarchy to represent the relationship between the three basic risk attributes and the 
safety level of a complex engineering system (and its components) can be developed and shown in Figure 1. 
It has several levels and the three basic attributes at the bottom level. In such a hierarchical structure, it is 
usually the case that risk analysis at a higher level makes use of the information produced at lower levels. It 
is therefore important to synthesise the evaluations of the risk attributes and the components with appropriate 
weight distributions (between them) so as to obtain the risk estimation of the whole system. When 
considering a group of attributes for evaluation, an AHP technique can provide judgements on the relative 
importance of these attributes and also to ensure that the judgements are quantified to an extent, which 
permits a quantitative interpretation of the judgement among these attributes [18]. Using an AHP technique 
to calculate the relative importance of each attribute has been well accepted and evidenced by many 
publications and applications in the literature [26] and thus, it is used to calculate the weight distributions 
between the parameters and components in the hierarchy. 
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Figure 1. A hierarchical diagram of system safety analysis [29]  
Step 3: Using fuzzy linguistic assessments allows the representation of information in a natural and adequate 
form when it is difficult to express the information with precision. It is commonly used by human experts to 
represent risk factors in risk analysis [2], [13], [14], [18], [21], [28], [29]. The linguistic variables for 
describing each attribute are decided according to the situation of the case of interest. The literature survey 
indicates that the linguistic variables and their membership functions used to describe L, C and P of a 
particular item may be defined on a unified utility space, in which 0 indicates the lowest risk contribution and 
10 means the highest risk contribution [22], [28], [29], as shown in Table I. 
 
Table I.  Linguistic variables of risk attributes and their fuzzy memberships 
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Safety 
parameters 
Linguistic variables Fuzzy 
memberships 
Likelihood 
(L) 
Very low (L1) (0, 0, 3, 4) 
low (L2) (3, 4, 5) 
Reasonably low (L3) (4, 5, 6) 
Average (L4) (5, 6, 7) 
Reasonably frequent (L5) 
Frequent (L6) 
Very frequent (L7) 
(6.5, 7, 9.5) 
(7, 9, 9.5) 
(9, 9.5, 10) 
Consequence 
(C) 
Negligible (C1) (0, 0, 1, 3) 
Marginal (C2) 
Moderate (C3) 
(1, 2, 3, 4) 
(3, 4, 6, 7) 
Critical (C4) (6, 7, 8, 9) 
Catastrophic (C5) (8, 9, 10, 10) 
Probability  
(P) 
Highly unlikely (P1) (0, 0, 1, 2) 
Unlikely (P2) (1, 2, 3, 4) 
Reasonably unlikely (P3) (3, 4, 5) 
Likely (P4) (4, 5, 6) 
 Reasonably likely (P5) (5, 6, 7, 8) 
Highly likely (P6) (7, 8, 9) 
Definite (P7) (8, 9, 10, 10) 
Safety (S) Good (S1) (0,0,2,4) 
Average (S2) (2,4,6) 
Fair (S3) (4,6,8) 
Poor (S4) (6, 8, 10, 10) 
 
Step 4: This step is to establish the belief links between each risk attribute’s linguistic variables (LI, CJ, PK) 
and the variables (SH) used to describe the safety levels of failure modes and the whole system. Generally, 
the belief degrees between the variables can be assigned based on multiple expert judgements. In this process, 
a fuzzy mapping approach based on utility theory is used with reference to the work by Li and Liao [12] to 
assist in obtaining the belief degrees. The philosophy of the approach is to calculate the belief degrees by 
referring to the comparison of the similarity between the fuzzy membership functions on a common utility 
(risk contribution) space of the linguistic variables, which are used to describe a pair of child-parent attributes 
(e.g. L and S). Specifically speaking, it can be symbolised as follows. 
 
Let 
IL
u  and 
HS
u  be the fuzzy membership functions of LI (I = 1, …, 7) and SH (H = 1, …, 4), respectively. 
The similarity degree between 
IL
u  and 
HS
u  is calculated using Eq. (5) due to its simplification [12], despite 
the availability of the other similarity degree measurement methods (e.g. distance-based).  
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 
dx)(
dx)}(),(min{
),(







xu
xuxu
uuS
I
HH
HI
L
SL
SL                (5) 
 
If two membership functions are the same, that is Liu =
HS
u , then ),(
HI SL
uuS =1. If two membership 
functions do not have any overlap, the similarity degree is zero. For other situations, the higher the 
percentage of the overlap is, the higher the similarity degree. In this process, it is particularly noteworthy that 
the fuzzy membership functions can be obtained using a fuzzy Delphi method [4] and the membership 
functions Liu  and 
HS
u  are developed on the basis of one common utility space (i.e. the scale [0–10] 
indicating risk contributions). After all the similarity degrees between 
IL
u  and 
HS
u  are computed, the belief 
degree L
HSIL ,
  for all I = 1, …, 7 and H = 1, …, 4, can be computed as follows: 
∑ ),(
),(
4
1
,


H
HSIL
HSILL
HSIL
uuS
uuS
                                      (6) 
 
From Eqs. (5) and (6), it can be noted that the more similar Liu  is to 
HS
u , the closer LI is to SH and the larger 
L
HSIL ,
  is. It can also be noted that the sum of L
HSIL ,
  is equal to 1. Thus, L
HSIL ,
  may be viewed as a 
conditional degree of risk contribution to which LI contributes to SH (conditioned on that the risk 
contributions from CJ and PK to SH are unknown). In this way, all fuzzy membership functions of the risk 
attributes (i.e.
IL
u , 
JC
u  and 
KP
u ) can be transformed into the belief structures with the fuzzy set of a utility 
decision conclusion space, SH.  
 
Having defined the belief links between the linguistic variables of the three risk attributes and the safety 
levels of the failure modes, it is straightforward to identify the belief links between the safety levels of the 
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failure modes, components, sub-systems and the whole system as follows.  






 )'(0
)'(1
,
HH
HHS
HSHS
                                             (7) 
where 'HS  indicates the linguistic safety variables of the parent attribute and SH represents the linguistic 
safety variables of its child attributes. 
 
Step 5: Before starting the safety analysis process, observations from experts should be analysed to 
determine their relationship with each (L, C, P) at the bottom level of the hierarchy. Four kinds of possible 
observations may be represented using membership functions to suit conditions under this study. They are 
either a single deterministic value with 100% certainty, a closed interval, a triangular distribution or a 
trapezoidal distribution [22].  
 
Having defined the membership functions of the three parameters as 
IL
u , 
JC
u  and 
KP
u , a transforming or 
matching function method [13] can be employed to perform the observation transformation and determine 
the subjective probabilities to which actual observations match each linguistic variable of the three safety 
parameters. The matching function method chooses the Max-Min operation to show the relationship between 
the real input fuzzy set ur and the corresponding fuzzy linguistic variables 
IL
u , 
JC
u  and 
KP
u , because it is a 
classical tool to set the matching degree between fuzzy sets [41]. Therefore, the subjective probabilities, ILrp  
to which real observations belong to 
IL
u  can be defined as follows [13]. 
IL
rpˆ  = (ur, 
IL
u ) = ))](),((minmax[ xx
I
r L
x
       (8) 
where x covers the domain of the input ur. Each I
L
rpˆ  represents the extent to which ur belongs to the defined 
linguistic variables in L. In order to keep the completeness, each ILrpˆ is normalised as 
IL
rp so that their sum 
equals one.  
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Step 6: As a result, an appropriate five-level belief link based safety analysis model can be represented. 
Using Eq. (2), all the input can be transformed into the relative output based on the linguistic variables SH of 
the safety level of the whole system at the top. The ER approach introduced in Eqs. (3) and (4) can be 
implemented to combine all the output and generate final conclusions, which are expressed using the four 
linguistic variables SH at the top level of the hierarchy. 
 
Step 7: In order to rank the safety estimates expressed by SH, the fuzzy linguistic variables require to be 
defuzzified by giving each of them an “appropriate” utility value (
HS
U ). Since the membership functions of 
SH, HSu  have been defined in Table I, HSU  can be obtained using defuzzification methods such as a centroid 
approach [17]. Then, the ranking order index RI associated with system safety can be obtained by 
∑
4
1

H
SH H
URI                                                       (9) 
where the numerical values of H  (H = 1, 2, …, 4) represent the belief degrees associated with the linguistic 
variables SH in the final output (safety level of the whole system) synthesised  by using the ER approach. 
 
Step 8: When a new method is developed, it requires testing to ensure its soundness. It may be especially 
important and desirable when subjective elements are involved in the methodology generated [38]. There are 
several well-accepted validation methods available before the methodology can be broadly accepted for use 
in practice. In this study, a benchmarking technique will be used to compare the FER method and the RIMER 
approach [13], [33] through the analysis of their correlation.  
 
4. A NUMERICAL STUDY OF AN OFFSHORE ENGINEERING SYSTEM 
In order to compare with the well-established RIMER method, the case study in the work [13] is re-visited 
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and investigated through the new FER method here. In this section, failure criticality analysis is carried out 
on risk introduced by the collision of a FPSO system with a shuttle tanker during tandem offloading 
operations. Only technical failure caused risk is assessed, though the operation failure has also been 
recognised as one of the major causes of collision. According to the literature survey, a technical failure that 
might cause collisions between the FPSO and a shuttle tanker during tandem offloading operations is a 
malfunction of the propulsion system. The four major causes to this technical failure are controllable pitch 
propeller (CPP), thruster (T), position reference system (PRS) and dynamics positioning system (DP) failures 
[6]. 
 
As a result, a hierarchy to represent the relationship between the three basic risk attributes and the safety 
levels of a malfunction of the propulsion system (and its four failure modes) can be developed. Next, the 
weights of the three basic safety parameters and the four failure modes require to be calculated using an AHP 
method as follows [18]. 
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A measure of the consistency of the two pair-wise comparisons has been conducted by computing their 
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individual consistency ratios. Both of the values have been validated to be less than 0.1 and thus, the pair-
wise comparisons are considered consistent and reasonable. 
 
After the fuzzy membership functions of all linguistic variables are acquired, the belief links between the 
basic parameters and the safety levels of failure modes may be calculated using the information of these 
variables. Generally, the evaluation of the belief links may be conducted in the common space of safety level 
SH, the sets described by the linguistic variables in Table I.  
 
In order to evaluate L
HSIL ,
 , C
HSJC ,
 and P
HSKP ,
 , it is desirable to use the fuzzy mapping technique in Eqs. 
(5) and (6). For example, the similarity degree between 
2C
u  and 
HS
u , (H = 1, 2, 3, 4) (see Figure 2) is 
calculated as follows. 
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Figure 2. Example of the belief degree calculation between C2 and SH (H = 1, 2, 3, 4) 
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Furthermore, using Eq. (6), ),( 2 HSC uFS can be normalised as follows. 
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In this way, fuzzy number C2 can be transformed into the belief structure with the safety level expressions 
(SH, H = 1, 2, 3, 4) and shown in the following form. 
2CF  = {(0.69, “good”), (0.31, “average”), (0, “fair”), (0, “poor”)} 
 
Using a similar calculation process, 
JC
F  (J =1, …, 5) can be obtained respectively. The belief links between 
CJ and SH of the failure modes and further the top level (the propulsion systems) can be constructed and 
shown in Figure 3 using Eq. (7). Similarly, the belief links between LI or PK and SH can be established for the 
fuzzy safety analysis model of the propulsion system.  
 
Having constructed the belief links, the next step is to calculate the input pi
k
 from observations. It is assumed 
that each input parameter (L, C or P) will be fed into the proposed safety model in terms of any of the four 
input forms described in Step 5 of Section 3 to address different levels of uncertainty. In this case study, the 
same subjective data in [13] from a panel of five experts from different disciplines is used here, as the one 
shown in Table II for the failure mode CPP. The five experts include a technical manager of more than 20 
years experience in the offshore industry from the UK HSE, a senior inspector of more than 20 years 
experience in the offshore industry from the UK HSE, a team leader of more than 20 years experience in the 
offshore safety sector from Shell, a senior engineer of more than 20 years experience in the offshore safety 
sector from Shell and a senior academic researcher of more than 15 working experience in marine and 
offshore fields.  
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In order to conduct safety estimation using the new FER, the expert judgements obtained above are 
transformed into the forms, which can be accepted by the belief link based inference mechanism. Therefore, 
Eq. (8) and a normalisation process can be used to compute pi
k
, which is associated with LI, CJ or PK, 
respectively. For example, Expert 1 used the triangular distribution input form to address the inherent 
uncertainty associated with the data and information available while assessing the three basic input attributes. 
The failure consequence severity C is described triangularly as (7.5, 8.5, 9.5). Using the fuzzy Max-Min 
operation in Eq. (8), these input values are transformed and then normalised into the distributed 
representation on the linguistic variables as follows. 
JC
rpˆ = {0 C1, 0 C2, 0 C3, 0.75 C4, 0.78 C5}      
JC
rp = {0 C1, 0 C2, 0 C3, 0.49 C4, 0.51 C5}      
In a similar way, the following is obtained. 
IL
rp ={0 L1, 0 L2, 0 L3, 0.108 L4, 0.378 L5, 0.378 L6, 0.135 L7} 
KP
rp = {0 P1, 0 P2, 0 P3, 0.1 P4, 0.5 P5, 0.3 P6, 0.1 P7} 
 
Figure 3. An example of transforming fuzzy CJ to SH 
Table II. Expert judgement of the three input parameters for the CPP failure 
Expert Input form L C P 
1 
 
E1 Triangular (6.5, 8, 9.5) (7.5, 8.5, 9.5) (5.5, 7, 8.5) 
E2 Triangular (5.5, 7.5, 9) (7, 8.5, 10) (5, 7.5, 9.5) 
E3 Closed interval [6, 8] [7, 9] [6.5, 9] 
E4 Trapezoidal {5.5, 6.5, 9, 10} {5.5, 7, 8, 10} {5, 7, 8, 8.5} 
E5 Deterministic  7.75 8.25 7.6 
 
Next, using Eq. (2) and Fig. (3), such input can be transformed into output and expressed by SH (H = 1, 2, 3, 
4) as follows.  



5
1
,
J
C
HSJC
C
JC
C
HS
p  = {0 S1, 0 S2, 0.152 S3, 0.848 S4} 
where 0.152 = (0.49 × 0.31) and 0.848 = (0.49 × 0.69 + 0.51 × 1). In a similar way, the following can be 
obtained.  
L
HS
  = {0 S1, 0.0135 S2, 0.2133 S3, 0.7722 S4} 
P
HS
  = {0 S1, 0.085 S2, 0.412 S3, 0.503 S4} 
 
Based on such output, together with the weight set obtained above, the ER based IDS is used to implement 
the combination of the three pieces of output and generate the safety estimate for the propulsion system due 
to the failure CPP by Expert 1. The assessment result is generated as follows and shown in Figure 4 where 
the generated result is {0 S1, 0.0147 S2, 0.1858 S3, 0.7996 S4} 
 
This result can be interpreted in a way that the safety estimate of the propulsion system due to CPP by Expert 
1 is “Average” with a belief degree of 0.0147, “Fair” with a belief degree of 0.1858 and “Poor” with a 
belief degree of 0.7996. 
 
The similar computations are performed by the other four experts for CPP. The safety estimates generated 
for CCP by the five experts are summarised in Table III. Similarly, the safety estimates the propulsion system 
due to the other three potential failures (T, PRS and DP) can be calculated. Tables IVa – IVb show the results of 
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multi-expert safety synthesis on collision risk between the FPSO and a shutter tanker due to CPP, T, PRS and 
DP caused technical failure using the new FER approach respectively. The synthesis is carried out using both 
equal and different (i.e. {wE1; wE2; wE3; wE4; wE5} = {0.3, 0.5, 0.9, 0.8, 1}) relative weights among the 
experts. 
 
Figure 4. The safety estimate for the failure CPP by Expert 1 
Table III. Safety estimate by five experts on the collision risk due to CPP 
Expert L C P S1 S2 S3 S4 
E1 (6.5, 8, 9.5) (7.5, 8.5, 9.5) (5.5, 7, 8.5) 0 0.0147 0.1858 0.7996 
E2 (5.5, 7.5, 9) (7, 8.5, 10) (5, 7.5, 9.5) 0 0.0335 0.2321 0.7344 
E3 [6, 8] [7, 9] [6.5, 9] 0 0.0177 0.235 0.7473 
E4 {5.5, 6.5, 9, 10} {5.5, 7, 8, 10} {5, 7, 8, 8.5} 0.0044 0.0794 0.2751 0.6411 
E5 7.75 8.25 7.6 0 0.0036 0.2003 0.7961 
 
Table IVa. Multi-expert safety synthesis based on the contributions from the four failures with equal expert weights 
Safety contributions from the technical failure modes Safety synthesis 
S1 (Good) S2 (Average) S3 (Fair) S4 (Poor) 
Safety estimate with all contributions from CPP, T, 
PRS and DP 
0.0013 0.0259 0.2083 0.7645 
Safety estimate with the only contribution from CPP 0.0006 0.0222 0.1857 0.7915 
Safety estimate with the only contribution from T 0.0029 0.0549 0.3099 0.6323 
Safety estimate with the only contribution from PRS 0.0015 0.0286 0.2712 0.6988 
Safety estimate with the only contribution from DP 0.0016 0.0238 0.1934 0.7812 
 
Table IVb. Multi-expert safety synthesis based on the contributions from the four failures with different expert weights 
Safety contributions from the technical failure modes Safety synthesis 
S1 (Good) S2 (Average) S3 (Fair) S4 (Poor) 
Safety estimate with all contributions from CPP, T, 
PRS and DP 
0.0019 0.0365 0.2358 0.7258 
Safety estimate with the only contribution from CPP 0.0011 0.0303 0.2045 0.7642 
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Safety estimate with the only contribution from T 0.0045 0.0849 0.3562 0.5544 
Safety estimate with the only contribution from PRS 0.0016 0.0304 0.2788 0.6892 
Safety estimate with the only contribution from DP 0.0023 0.0305 0.2125 0.7548 
 
To calculate risk ranking index values associated with various failure modes, it is required to describe the 
four safety linguistic variables SH (H = 1, …, 4) using utility values. The centroid defuzzification method is 
used to assign appropriate utility values of SH. In the centroid method, the utility/crisp value is computed by 
finding the value of the centre of gravity of the membership function for the fuzzy number. From Table I, 
HS
U can be computed and obtained as follows. 
{ 1SU , 2SU , 3SU , 4SU } = {1.556, 4, 6, 8.444} 
where the ordering of the utility values of SH indicates that the larger the risk index values are, the higher the 
associated potential risk. The risk ranking index value RICCP associated with the failure CPP is calculated 
based on the multi-expert safety synthesis shown in Table (IVa) with the equal weight and using Eq. (9) as 
follows. 
888.7444.87915.061875.0
40222.0556.10006.0∑
4
1

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H
SHHCCP URI   
 
Based on the results shown in Tables 4a and 4b, the risk ranking index values associated with CPP, T, PRS 
and DP can be calculated and the results are summarised in Table V.  
 
Table V. Risk ranking using the new FER method 
Ranking items Expert weights Ranking 
CPP T PRS DP 
Risk ranking index value Equal weight 7.888 7.423 7.645 7.877 
Different weights 7.818 7.165 7.617 7.774 
Risk ranking order Equal weight 1 4 3 2 
Different weights 1 4 3 2 
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From Table V, it can be noted that for the two sets of weights assigned to the experts, the potential risk 
caused by CPP is always the highest and thus, it deserves more attention to reduce its potential risk to 
ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practical). T is always ranked as the safest among the four failures and the 
potential risks caused by DP and PRS are ranked second and third, respectively. It is also noteworthy that the 
output with a small difference between the risk index values of the four failure modes reflects the similar 
input between the four failure modes from the five experts. The correlation between input and output may 
reveal that the model is sensitive and be capable of effectively dealing with the approximation associated 
with subjective judgement.  
 
The benchmarking between the new model and the well-established RIMER method is also conducted to 
demonstrate the FER’s reliability and unique characteristics. Because the two approaches are given the same 
fuzzy input in terms of subjective judgements, the final risk assessment results including safety estimates and 
ranking order should be kept in harmony to a significant extent in order to validate the feasibility of the 
proposed FER approach. According to [13], the safety estimates with the contributions from all the failure 
modes and the risk ranking orders of the four modes with different expert weights are presented in Table VI.  
 
 
Table VI. Safety estimates and risk ranking using RIMER 
Compared 
items 
Expert 
weights 
Safety estimates 
S1 
(Good) 
S2 
(Average) 
S3 
(Fair) 
S4 
(Poor) 
Safety 
estimates 
Equal 
weight 
0 0.0106 0.4698 0.5196 
Different 
weights 
0 0.0115 0.4902 0.4938 
  Ranking 
  CPP T PRS DP 
Risk ranking 
order 
Equal 
weight 
1 4 3 2 
Different 
weights 
1 4 2 3 
 
25 
 
Comparing Table IV (both IVa and IVb) and Table VI, it can be found that the highest belief degree is 
always assigned to the safety linguistic variable “Poor” while the combined belief degrees assigned to “Fair” 
and “Poor” are more than 95% in both FER and RIMER methods. However, it is noted that the belief degrees 
assigned to “Fair” in the RIMER method is larger than the ones in the FER approach. This is mainly caused 
by the different ways of assigning belief degrees in the two studies. A sensitivity analysis has therefore been 
conducted to test the two ways (of degree distribution), with the result showing that impact of the input 
changes to the safety estimate in RIMER is inconsistent (sometimes irrational due to the incompatible rules 
involved) while it is always consistent in FER.  
 
In terms of risk ranking, when the experts’ weights are equally assigned, it has been shown that the four 
failures have been assessed and ranked in the same order in the two studies. When the experts are given 
different weights, the ranking orders of DP and PRS are different in the two studies. After a careful 
investigation, it has been disclosed that the difference ranking orders are caused by the different utility values 
assigned to the four safety linguistic variables 
HS
U . It has been tested that if the same utility values are given, 
the ranking orders in the two cases will be identical. The above shows that the results obtained using the new 
FER and traditional RIMER are kept in harmony to a significant extent.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper proposes a fuzzy link based hierarchical group decision making framework for maritime system 
safety assessment. In the framework, the safety estimates of the basic events/failures are first carried out 
using a new FER approach, in which three belief link bases are developed to model the relationship between 
risk attributes, L, C, P and the failure safety level, respectively. The ER approach is then used to synthesise 
such estimates to obtain the safety assessment of the failure events and the one of the top level event in the 
form of linguistics expressions with belief degrees. Finally, such results are defuzzified through assigning 
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utility values to the linguistics expressions for risk ranking and prioritisation. Different from most 
conventional risk analysis methodologies, the framework introduced is characterised with a unique feature 
associated with unification of input and output data. In the safety analysis modelling, each input can be 
represented as a probability distribution on fuzzy linguistic values for the lower level attributes using a belief 
structure. The main advantage of doing so is that precise data, random numbers and subjective judgements 
with uncertainty can be consistently modelled under a unified form. The input data transformed by the linked 
fuzzy belief structures can be unified, taking into account subjective judgements with uncertainties of both 
probabilistic and possibilistic nature.  
 
More importantly, the new approach also enables the elimination of incompatible rules possibly introduced in 
the traditional fuzzy rule bases and makes the risk inference more rational through analysing the relationship 
between each lower level attribute and the upper level one in a parent child link individually. The ER 
approach provides a procedure for aggregating calculation, which can preserve the original features of 
multiple attributes with various types of information. This provides a solution to updating the safety result 
when new additional risk attribute(s) are identified at a later stage. The combination of the fuzzy link bases 
and the ER approach offers a powerful tool to conduct engineering system safety assessment and meanwhile, 
shows significant potential in solving the problems of MADM under uncertainty when appropriately tailored. 
Such advantages of the new approach are demonstrated by the results generated from a series of case studies 
on collision risk between a FPSO and a shuttle tanker. Furthermore due to its generality, the new approach is 
capable of offering an effective solution to tackling risk data with uncertainty in many engineering systems, 
including but not limited to those in offshore, marine and transportation sectors.   
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